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The property tax is an important local revenue source in many
countries, but it is often underused as a source for financing local
expenditures. In India, many local governments have initiated
administrative and valuation reforms to increase the yield from property
taxes. In this paper, we examine the fiscal and distributional implication
of the ongoing and potential assessment reforms in two Indian cities –
Bangalore and Pune. While our findings are specific to these two cases,
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the reform efforts and underlying problems are representative of most
urban local governments. Our main finding is that reform efforts that
bring assessment of the property tax base closer to market values have
significant positive impacts on revenue generation, and do not have
adverse consequences in terms of the tax burden faced by the poor.
Further, regulations such as rent control significantly impinge on the
growth of revenues from the property tax and in fact do not serve the
interests of the poor. While current assessment reforms are a good first
step towards increasing the performance of the property tax, structural
issues such as improved valuation, increasing buoyancy of the tax, and
building taxpayer confidence need to be addressed to make these
reforms sustainable. 5
Fiscal and Distributional
Implications of Property Tax
Reforms in Indian Cities
Introduction
In India, as in many countries, the property tax is a major fiscal
instrument available to urban local bodies (ULBs) or municipal
governments for raising their own revenues. While being a key revenue
source, the property tax is relatively underused and has limited buoyancy
relative to the overall growth in economic activity. The ability to finance
growing local government expenditures via property taxes is severely
constrained by administrative, regulatory, and technical shortfalls. In
particular, weak administration and strong political interests limit the
extent to which local government can tap on an expanding tax base and
enforce compliance with taxes. For example, in a recent study of
property taxes, Rao and Ravindra (2002) find low rates of tax collections
across a sample of municipal corporations  55 percent of taxable
properties in Bangalore, 50 percent in Kolkata and 57 percent in Mumbai
(data pertain to 1998-99)
1.  Problems with weak tax administration are
exacerbated by regulatory and legal constraints that link tax bases to
rental values of properties which are stagnant with rent control laws, and
distortionary land use and zoning regulations that adversely influence
land prices. 
With institutional and regulatory reforms emanating from the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA 1992), additional administrative and
fiscal functions have been devolved to local authorities. Cities are now
responsible for designing strategies to maintain and improve public
services, and finding instruments to finance these activities in a
sustainable manner. In response to growing revenue needs for financing
infrastructure, public services, and other local amenities, many ULBs
have initiated reforms to improve the performance of their local fiscal
handles  in particular, the property tax. The property tax is a prime
candidate as the major local government revenue source. Octroi, a6
locally assessed customs charge (for domestic trade)  which has
traditionally provided a significant revenue stream to local governments,
has already been abolished in many states. Furthermore, states seem to
capture sales taxes that fund local expenditure elsewhere.
Consequently, there are few other choices for mainstay of local
government finances apart from taxes related to real estate.
These reforms have typically focused on improving the
administration of the tax, and in some cases accompanied by changes in
valuation of the tax base. Administrative reforms include strengthening
enforcement of property tax collections, expanding the tax base by
updating property tax rolls via ‘discovery’ of new properties,
computerising billing and collection, and introducing self assessment
schemes where residents could declare their property tax dues on a
standardised form and avoid frequent interaction with rent seeking tax
collectors. These reforms appear to have positive impacts on local
revenues. For example, the city of Mirzapur implemented a Geographic
Information System (GIS) to identify unassessed properties and
computerised its municipal tax records. The ULB commissioned a
complete inventory of properties in its jurisdiction, which was made
possible with the availability of high-resolution satellite images coupled
with local surveys and integration of existing land records. Following
these innovations, there has been a tenfold increase in property
assessments and tax collection has almost tripled in 4 years. In
Bangalore, there has been a 33 percent increase in revenues between
1999 and 2001 due to increases in collection rates and the number of
assessed properties, coupled with valuation improvements to increase
average tax payments per property. 
While property tax administration reforms have quite taken off
and attained popularity in policy debates in terms of increasing local
fiscal capacity, associated reform efforts focused on assessment and
valuation are less evident. In most ULBs, notional property rental values
are used as the base for assessing property taxes. Using rental values
however presents a major challenge as rent control laws in many cities
have limited the scope for the notional rent to increase with changes in
local demand and incomes, or keep up with costs of living increases. As
a consequence, the tax base is stagnant, and an upward adjustment of
tax rates is the only way to increase revenues from the property tax. In
the few cases where cities have moved away from rental values towards
a capital value based assessment, it is unlikely that the potential gains7
have been fully realised. Reasons include absence of a well functioning
real estate market that provides accurate information on property values,
the existence of various land use and zoning regulations, and high
transaction costs that adversely affect land prices. 
In this paper we do not intend to provide a detailed review of
property tax reforms or assess the implementation of administrative and
valuation reforms. There is considerable published literature on this topic
(Rao and Ravindra 2002; World Bank 2003). Other useful papers include
Bagchi (1997), Jha (2002), and Karnik and Pethe (2003). Our aim is to
complement this work by focusing on two questions: (a) what is the
consequence of property tax reforms on revenue generation? and (b)
what are the distributional effects of these reforms? In doing so, we wish
to highlight the costs imposed by rent control laws and one particular
transaction tax – stamp duties, on revenue expansion. Further, as equity
is an important guiding principle of a well functioning tax system, it would
be would be worth assessing whether reform efforts have adverse
distributional effects. 
Our discussion is based on analysis of property tax regimes in
two Indian cities, Pune and Bangalore, where we utilise household
survey data along with city level tax assessment records. While our
empirical analysis and findings are specific to these two cities, the
general issues and lessons are broadly applicable to Indian cities as
many ULBs are planning reforms of their property tax systems to expand
fiscal capacity in a decentralised setting.
2 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we
assess the relative revenue implications of alternate valuation systems.
Distributional effects are discussed in section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
II. Revenue Implications of Alternate 
Assessment Systems
Indian cities are currently experimenting with various approaches
on how they should tax property. Bahl and Linn (1992) identify three
basic forms of property taxation in use around the world. Property taxes
are based on (a) annual rental value (ARV) of the property, (b) capital8
value (CV) of the land and improvements, and/or (c) site value of the
land. Most Indian cities use the rental value of property as the base for
the property tax.
3 While a few cities have adopted a capital value base
(such as municipalities in Karnataka), implementation of the capital value
system is still in its infancy. 
In terms of tax administration, several ULBs use an area or
zone-based system as a standardised way of assessing the tax base.
This system can be used with rental values or capital values as the base
for valuation. With the capital value system, values per unit of land
(usually per square foot) are estimated, and the tax base is the product
of this unit value and land area, plus the value of the structure. The latter
is determined in an analogous way: a basic value per square foot is
determined, weighted by construction quality and multiplied by area. 
While the rental value system and capital value systems are
similar in theory as the discounted stream of net rent payments is
equivalent to the capital value of the property, this does not hold true in
practice as the relationship between annual values and market rents, as
well as capital valuation and market prices are quite ambiguous. For
residential properties, the divergence between market rents and
assessed annual values may be due to either legally allowable reduction
in annual values or distortions by rent control laws. 
In this section, we discuss the revenue implications of alternate
property tax systems for residential real estate using recently collected
survey data from Bangalore and Pune.
4 Details on the survey data and
sampling frame are provided in Appendix 1. The city of Bangalore has
recently adopted innovations in its property tax assessment as well as
collection procedures, moving from a rental value to a capital value
system. The city of Pune uses a rental value system to assess property
taxes, where a notional rent fetching capacity is used to classify
properties in the city into three broad zones.
5 
The case studies for Bangalore and Pune focus on the following
questions:
  What are the revenue implications of alternate assessment
systems?
  What is the incidence of property taxes across these systems? 9
Survey data for individual households are used to simulate tax
liability for different property tax bases. Simulations show that
considerable revenue benefits can be gained from moving to market-
based (either market rental or market capital value) assessment
systems. Distribution effects are examined in the following section.
2.1 Bangalore
The Bangalore City Corporation (BMP)
6 and the state of
Karnataka have made several innovations to increase revenues from
property taxes. The BMP has moved away from a rental value system of
property tax assessment to a quasi-capital value based assessment. For
assessment purposes, the city is divided into six land value zones. A
“zone” is not necessarily a contiguous area. As shown below in table 1,
the property tax administration classifies buildings in each zone
according to five residential and 11 non-residential categories (based on
construction type, age of structure, and current use). Each category is
assigned a value per square foot. From discussions with BMP officials,
we learnt that the values assigned to each category should in principle
be capital values, but in practice reflect ‘stamp values’ or ‘guidance
values’, and are not based on any real transactions data. The sum of the
land and the building value is the taxable value. There is a preferential
treatment to owner-occupiers in the form of a 50 percent reduction in
rental value for certain types of properties.
The state of Karnataka has also amended its rent control acts to
de-link the tax base from the effects of rent control. Legislations have
also been approved to introduce a capital value system (CVS) for
property tax assessment.
7 Although the legislation has come into effect
from April 2002 in all city corporations in the state including Bangalore,
the CVS is yet to be fully implemented. Under the CVS, property tax will
be levied on the total cost of the property. The cost of land and the cost
of construction less depreciation will be the total cost of the property. The
rate of tax under this system ranges between 0.3 percent to 0.6 percent.11
Analysis of Alternate Property Tax Systems 
The analysis of alternate property tax systems is presented in
three parts. In the first part, we estimate property taxes for residential
properties using the recently initiated zone-based system. The second
part provides property tax estimates using the rental value system.
Before implementing the zone-based system, the BMP assessed
properties based on their annual rental values (ARV). The ARV of a
property was defined as the “gross annual rent at which the building or
land may reasonably be expected to let from month to month or year to
year.” This assessment process was problematic as there were no firm
guidelines on what constituted reasonable rental value and brought in
considerable discretion in the assessment process. As the corporation
did not issue any guidelines to revenue officers on fair and objective
assessment, this often led to informal agreements between assessors
and homeowners, leading to a revenue loss for the city corporation.
Irrespective of the size of the property or its market value, the rent was
the factor for arriving at the assessed value. If a property was subject to
the Rent Control Act, then the rent fixed by the rent controller was the
basis for arriving at the assessed value (Rao and Ravindra, 2002).
In the third part of the analysis, we provide estimates of property
taxes using ‘market rents’ and capital value of the property. These
estimates are provided to examine the potential increase in revenues
from moving to a more buoyant base for assessment purposes. In these
estimates, we only examine the potential impact of different assessment
options in terms of increasing revenues. There are likely to be additional
gains from administrative reforms, changing land use and zoning
ordinances, and other initiatives, which will further enhance revenues
from property taxes. These are, however, not analysed here.
We analyse recently collected household survey data from
Bangalore to develop these estimates. The Bangalore household survey
was conducted during the period July through September 2001, and was
designed to be representative of the BMP area. The corporation area is
divided into 100 wards. All households, except for residents of military
cantonments and institutional populations, are part of the sampling
universe. The sample size is 2905. The sample fractions in each ward
were chosen in proportion to the number of households of that ward,
according to the preliminary estimates of the census (March 2001).
812
Households in the sample survey were geo-coded, so it is
possible to examine the exact location of each sample point. Using the
street address and zone information provided by the BMP, sample
households were assigned to zones following the city’s classification
system. The rateable value for each property was then computed using
the same formula as employed by the BMP. Data on construction type,
use and age of the house are available from the survey. Because
housing information is available for all households (owners and renters),
estimates for the entire city are generated with this methodology.
9 Taxes
ere then computed based on the corporation’s tax rates and surcharges.
A randomly selected sample of 105 properties was drawn to
assess the accuracy of the survey data. Our survey estimates were
compared to actual tax payments registered in BMP’s records, and the
difference between the two sources was found to be Rs. 60 per property,
which is a small deviation between predicted and actual tax payments.
Thus, we believe that the survey data are reliable for the analysis.
Zone-based System
First, estimated property tax liabilities are compared to what
households reported they paid. Data for this exercise are only available
for owner-occupied units, who answered questions on property tax
payments. Using the zone-based method (with BMP guidelines), the
average property tax per household for all sample properties (owner and
renter occupied) is estimated at Rs. 2,937. Data on actual property tax
payments under the zone-based system are available for 990
homeowners. The average property tax reported to have been paid is
Rs. 2,550, whereas the estimated property tax for this subset of
homeowners in the sample is Rs. 2,377. The difference between the two
estimates is only Rs. 173, suggesting either measurement error or a very
small degree of misreporting. Across housing categories, considerably
larger differences are found for properties in revenue sites (about Rs.
300 per property) and high-end private developments (about Rs. 775 per
property).These housing categories are described in detail in appendix 2.
Rental Value System
Property tax liability was also estimated for the previously used
rental value system. For owner-occupied housing units, residents were
asked “How much did you pay in property taxes before the last revision?”13
This value was used as the property tax estimate prior to implementation
of the unit value system in April 2000. For renter-occupied housing units,
residents were asked “How much do you pay in rent each month?” Using
reported rents as the rateable values, the property tax was estimated for
each property using the tax rates and other factors specified by the BMP.
After property taxes were estimated for owners and renters, they were
compared to estimates from the unit value system.
The average property tax under the previous rental value system
is Rs. 1,820, which is about 65 percent lower than the estimate using the
zone-based system. The distribution of this increase across various
housing categories is shown in table 2. What is very interesting is that
the largest revenue increases are for dwelling units in the formal housing
production system, i.e., those developed by public sector agencies and
cooperative housing societies. Property taxes using rental values are 70
percent less compared to the revised zone value system. These
comparisons show that the unit value system leads to increases in
property taxes for all classes of property.
Table 2: Distribution of Property Tax Changes by Moving from Rental
Values to the Area-based Rental Value System (BMP)
Housing category Property taxes 
(in rupees) using
Rental value







Non-notified squatter settlement 126 295 43
Notified squatter settlement 496 939 53
Resettlement 198 503 39
Unauthorised revenue site 1877 2714 69
Vatara 1180 4369 27
BDA/KHB/BMP/EWS plots 2699 3658 74
BDA/KHB/BMP/EWS flats 1115 1553 72
Cooperative housing 2355 3039 77
Employer housing 1568 3139 50
Private builders 2594 4338 60
City improvement trust board 1785 3128 57
Average 1820 2795 6514
Market Rents and Capital Value
The next simulation attempts to estimate the revenue impacts of
moving to a market-based rental value assessment. Survey respondents
were asked to value the monthly rental cost for a similar unit in the
neighborhood. This estimate of the market rental cost of a dwelling unit is
likely to be an underestimate. Although rent control legislations were
repealed recently, residual effects of this system will still affect
perceptions of market rents. The price data may also be biased
downwards due to limited publicly available information on recent
transactions. Further, both rents and prices will be somewhat distorted
due to Floor Space Index (FSI) restrictions and inefficient zoning
regulations. Thus, these values are likely to be higher once the residual
effects of rent controls dissipate, and other development restrictions are
corrected.
All survey respondents were asked to estimate the monthly
rental value for a similar unit in the neighborhood. Using the same
procedure as for current rents (for the sample of renters), property taxes
are estimated with ‘market rents’ for each household in the entire
sample. The average property tax using ‘market rents’ is Rs. 3,910 per
household, which is 33.1 percent higher than the present system and
115.1 percent higher than estimates under the previous rental value
system (see, table 3). On average, for owner-occupied households, the
tax liability is Rs. 3,357, and for renter occupied, the liability is Rs. 4,750.














Area-based system 2938 62
Market rents 3911 115 33
Market values 3890 114 32
The Government of Karnataka has amended section 109 of the
Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 permitting a move from the
ARV system to a CV system for property tax assessment. According to
the CV system, property taxes will be levied on the total property cost,15
which is defined as the cost of land and construction minus depreciation.
As noted above, the tax rate under this system ranges from 0.3 to 0.6
percent.
Survey respondents were asked to estimate market values of
their properties. The question was phrased similar to the question on
market rents where respondents were asked the price of a similar house
(as theirs) in their neighborhood. Using these values as the perceived
market prices, property taxes were computed, based on the methodology
provided in the revised Karnataka Municipal Corporations (Amendment)
Act, 2000. The average property tax using this method is Rs. 3,890,
which is about the same as the market rental value base, and about one-
third more than the present system of assessing unit values. It produces
more than double the revenues vs. the previous rental value system
(see, table 3). In general, owners pay less than renters. The average
property tax for occupied housing is Rs. 3,119 compared to Rs. 5,224 for
renters.
The analysis across assessment systems suggests that there
are considerable potential revenue gains from moving to a system that
reflects market values. The unit-value system is a step in the right
direction. In comparison to the rental value system, revenues increase by
62 percent in the zone-based system. Further potential gains arise from
a capital or market-based assessment system. Interestingly, predicted
revenues from market rental values and capital values are about the
same, confirming theoretical priors of equivalence in relatively free
markets. If the Corporation moved to capital value assessments, there is
considerable scope for enhanced revenues.
2.2 Pune
Property taxes are an important revenue source for the Pune
Municipal Corporation (PMC). There are 3,20,000 registered properties
in the PMC jurisdiction and another 90,000 in fringe villages, which have
recently been incorporated into the PMC jurisdiction. For the year 1999-
2000, revenues from property tax collection were Rs. 381.5 million
(Karnik and Pethe, 2003), which is about 9.3 percent of own-source
revenues.
Property rental values are used for valuation of the tax base. A
unit or area-based method is currently being used to assess rental16
values. The city is classified into three zones for setting tax rates, and
the rateable values are based on a notional rent fetching capacity of the
property.
10  These values range from Rs. 1-1.3 per square foot for
residential properties. The assessment rate is twice this amount for
commercial properties. A 40 percent rebate on the rateable value is
offered to owner-occupied properties, and another 15 percent rebate is
offered for maintenance expenditures.
11  Once the rateable values are
established, a general tax rate ranging from 14 to 38 percent is applied
to determine tax liability.
12 The tax rate is set according to the rateable
value and is listed in table 4.
Table 4: Tax Rates Based on Annual Rental Values in Pune





Source: Pune Municipal Corporation
In addition to this general tax rate, additional surcharges or
cesses are included for water supply, conservancy, and fire services.
These cesses are approximately 15 percent of the rateable value.
Discussions with PMC officials indicate that the total rateable value is
estimated at Rs. 150 crore, with collection rates around 80 percent.
Residents in slums are not liable for property taxes. In notified slums
however, flat charges of Rs. 192 for services such as toilets and street
maintenance, and Rs. 375 for individual water connections are levied
annually. The PMC has 25 tax inspectors and five supervisors to monitor
property tax collections. Tax payments can be made in one of the 14
ward offices. While the property tax bill is sent once a year, payments
can be made every six months.
Analysis of Alternate Property Tax Systems 
We use household survey data for Pune to estimate the
implications of various property tax systems and valuation procedures.
The survey in Pune was conducted during August-September 2002, and
was designed to be representative of the Pune Municipal Corporation
area. The city area is divided into 48 wards. All households of the city are
part of the sampling universe with the exception of residents of military
cantonments and institutional populations (e.g., prisons). The target17
sample size was 2900 households, and the final sample size is 2850. To
ensure that all parts of the city are covered by the sample, sample
fractions in each ward were chosen in proportion to the number of
households of that ward according to the preliminary estimates of the
census of March, 2001.
Property tax yields for this sample of properties were estimated
under various scenarios. Our principal concern is how the shift to a
system that taxes market values would impact revenues and the
distribution of tax burdens, by comparison with the present system. The
first step is to calculate a baseline, i.e., the revenue yields and tax
burden distribution under the present system as estimated, using this
survey. We follow PMC guidelines to estimate tax liability for all
properties.
13 This analysis was possible because the survey included
detailed information on the characteristics of each of the dwelling units.
The basic comparison in this analysis is property tax liability under the
present system versus property taxes under a market value system.
These survey data are also used to estimate the revenue cost of rent
control, and to estimate the under valuation of property by the stamp
office.
Evaluating the Present Rental Value System
Using the broad guidelines provided by the PMC, property taxes
are estimated for survey properties using the unit or area-based method.
The average property tax liability is estimated to be Rs. 3,815. The data
in table 5 (columns 1 and 2) show how estimated property taxes vary
across housing categories, for all housing units and for owner occupiers,
respectively. Note the very large differences among property types, and
particularly the high estimates for wadas and chawls vs. other housing in
the core city area. ‘Wadas’ represent the old part of the city where
housing quality has been deteriorating over many years. ‘Chawls’ are
group housing units initially developed for industrial workers. 
While these are estimates of property tax liability, it is useful to
evaluate the extent to which these are related to actual property taxes
paid to the PMC. For the sample of owner-occupied dwelling units,
survey respondents were asked about their property tax payments to
PMC in the previous year (i.e. 2001). The data in table 5 provide a
comparison of estimated and reported property tax payments.18
Table 5: Differences between Estimated and Reported Property Taxes
Housing category For all
housing
units
















Unauthorised colony 2864 2353 2057 14
Wadas 11850 6201 1864 332
Cooperative housing 9483 9627 2560 376
Private builders /
colonies 3963 3311 2775 19
Core city area 5131 5091 3064 66
Chawls 6693 3773 2212 71
Urban village 2190 2029 1782 14
Overall 3816 2049 1606 28
Average property tax liability is estimated at Rs. 2049 for owner-
occupied dwelling units.
14 In comparison, reported average property
taxes for the same units are Rs. 1606. The reported tax estimates are
about 28 percent less than the estimated tax liability. There is, of course,
considerable variation in these estimates across housing categories. We
find that taxes paid are consistently lower than the estimated property tax
liability. Across categories, residents of wadas and cooperative housing
are currently paying almost 4 times lower than their estimated tax
liabilities.
The question arises, why the average difference between
computed liability and reported payments should be as large as 28
percent. Assuming that our survey provides an accurate estimate of tax
liability, we can speculate that the difference is due to either under-
assessment or application of an incorrect tax rate. Either way, a shortfall
of 28 percent in true tax liability is a significant revenue cost, even if it
applied only to owner occupied properties.
Next, for all properties, tax liability is estimated based on the
‘true market rental value” of the property. The estimates of market rents19
are provided by the respondents. The question asked was “what is the
true monthly rental value for a similar unit in this neighborhood”. This is
used as an approximation of the market rental value of a dwelling unit.
The data in table 6 show that the average level of property tax liability
would be higher by Rs. 1,883 using market rents, which is 55 percent
greater than the estimates using the present area-based system.









Resettlement 2,427 3,994 64.5
Unauthorised colony 2,864 5,486 91.6
Wadas 11,510 10,999 -4.4
MHADA plots 2,013 3,303 64.1
MHADA flats 904 7,229 700.0
Cooperative housing 9,698 18,596 91.8
Employer housing 5,704 11,357 99.1
Private builders/colonies 3,970 12,466 214.0
Core city area 5,176 12,860 148.4
Chawls 6,957 5,021 -27.8
Urban village 2,211 5,387 143.7
Total 3,444 5,327 54.7
A market rent base for property taxation would lead to lower tax
liabilities for housing types with the poorest amenities. Services and
amenities in wadas and chawls are quite poor due to infrequent
maintenance and structural upgrades. Further, with the exception of
households in the slums, the welfare status of residents in these housing
categories is the lowest. In summary, moving from a unit value system to
a market rental value system increases aggregate tax revenue potential
by 55 percent and plays a redistributive role by reducing the burden in
areas with poor services and amenities, which are homes to the poorer
residents of the city.20
The Impact of Rent Control
Many local governments limit the level of rateable value to the
level of controlled rents, and this seriously compromises efforts to use
the property tax as a principal source of financing local services. This
has been pointed out by various researchers examining the Indian
property tax system over years. Two questions continue to arise: who
really benefits from rent control, and what is the property tax loss on
account of rent control?
Rent control regulations in India were designed over 50 years
ago to protect the interests of lower and middle-income groups.
However, there is evidence that this regulation affects all income groups.
Survey data from Pune (reported below in table 7) show that the benefits
from rent controls accrue to all welfare categories. For households
reporting no increases in rents over their stay in the current place of
residence, 35 percent belong to the two highest welfare categories.
Similarly, approximately 40 percent of households with annual increases
in rents of less than 1 percent are in the two highest welfare quintiles.
Thus, the benefits of rent control do not disproportionately accrue to poor
and middle-income households.




Annual increase in rent (%)
Quintile 0 1 2.5
1 20.6 20.1 18.4
2 18.9 17.7 20.2
3 24.6 22.5 24.1
4 20.6 23.0 22.7
5 15.4 16.8 14.5
We estimate the revenue cost of rent control in the following
way. The household survey questions the sample of renters “How much
was the monthly rent when the dwelling unit was first rented?” With rent
controls, the rateable value would be fixed using the rental value at the
time of initial letting. Using the initial rent as the rateable base and the
rates prescribed by the PMC, property taxes were estimated for this
sample of properties. Average property tax per household is estimated to
be Rs. 1,714. This estimate only includes data for renters and excludes21
residents in slums (both notified and non notified). In comparison,
average property taxes using the unit value system (for the same
sample) are estimated to be Rs. 9,355, which is 445 percent higher than
estimates using initial rents (see, table 8). Further, using market rents,
average property taxes are estimated to be Rs. 10,186, which is an
increase of approximately 500 percent.
16
Even accounting for potential measurement and estimation
errors, the magnitude of the cost of rent control on the city’s finances
appears to be substantial. A four to five fold increase in property tax
revenue potential is possible by de-linking property taxes from the rental
value system in cases where property tax assessments are limited by
stringent rent control regulations.
Table 8: Estimated Increase of Property Tax in Comparison to 
Rent Control Scenario





Rental values (Initial rent) 1714
Unit value system (PMC) 9355 445
Rental values (market rent) 10186 494
Note: Data are only for renter occupied housing units
Capital Value Estimates
A final simulation estimates the revenue impact of moving to a
capital value (CV) system of property assessment. Many cities and
states, such as, Maharashtra and Karnataka are altering their property
tax assessment legislations to experiment with various forms of CV
assessment. In principle, the CV should reflect the market value of the
property, or the price the property would fetch in the market. Due to thin
markets, incomplete information of property sales, and limited
enforcement capacity, most Indian cities that are planning a shift to CV
intend to use the registered or ‘stamp value’ of the property as the base
for capital value assessments.
The Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) in
Maharashtra conducts property valuation based on a quasi-hedonic
model approach. Discussions with TCPD officials suggests that valuers22
use information on recent sales, future developments, infrastructure
quality and local amenities/ disamenities to estimate market values for
properties in various zones within the city. Due to the location of
heterogeneous properties within zones, limited trained staff to conduct
appraisals, and considerable informality in the valuation process, it is
possible that in practice, this valuation system may not produce accurate
estimates of property values. Further, high stamp duty on property
transactions may produce incentives for underreporting the true value of
property transactions.
As we do not have specific information on the tax rate and other
specifications needed to compute a capital based tax, we compare
reported market values of properties with stamp value data collected for
a small subset of properties in our sample.
17  To estimate the market
values of properties, respondents in the sample survey were asked,
“What would be the estimated present market price for a similar unit in
this neighborhood?” These values are compared to estimated stamp
values of the properties. Stamp values are computed by multiplying the
per square foot values estimated by TCPD by the area of the property.
Properties in non-notified or notified slums are not included. The final
sample has data on 126 properties. By this estimate, the average stamp
values (or approximation of the Ready Reckoner value) are Rs.
6,12,000, compared to the average market value of Rs. 7,25,000. This
suggests that perceived market values are about 18.5 percent higher
than the stamp values.
The distribution of the difference between these two estimates of
property value is provided in table 9. Market values are considerably
higher than stamp values for properties in cooperative-housing societies,
unauthorised colonies, housing units developed by private developers
(which are usually high value properties), and in the core city area. On
the other hand, market values are about the same for properties in
“wadas”,  chawls  and on the urban fringe which have recently been
annexed into the city’s jurisdiction. These results are consistent with
‘market-based’ signals which reflect housing quality and amenities, which
may not be picked up using large area-based classification of property
rates, as in the stamp value system. The housing categories with
significant increases in values are those that would fetch higher
premiums due to relatively better housing stock and higher levels of
services and amenities. In the final analysis, the market values not only
are higher in aggregate than the stamp values, but in fact also serve a23
redistribution function by realigning prices with housing quality and
availability of public services and amenities.
Table 9: Difference between Market and Stamp Value Estimates









Note: Sample size – 126 properties
Data Source: The World Bank (2002) – Pune household survey
III. Distributive Effects
A good tax system is one that produces adequate public revenue
in an equitable and efficient manner. In addition to its capacity in terms of
revenue generation, the property tax system can also be evaluated
according to various other criteria. These include equity or fairness to the
taxpayers, ease and simplicity of administration, neutrality with regard to
resource allocation, harmony with the rest of the tax system, compliance
and legitimacy, and accountability of tax officials. In this section, we
complement the analysis of revenue generation by focusing on equity
issues. 
Equity in property taxation is typically examined by horizontal or
vertical measures. Vertical equity refers to the belief that taxpayers with
greater ability to pay should face higher tax burdens than those with
lesser ability. Vertical equity assumes that a tax should be progressive
(based on income or wealth) to be fair. Horizontal equity refers to the
belief that taxpayers with equal ability to pay ought to have similar tax
burdens. For example, residents living in identical properties would pay
the same tax.24
Vertical Equity
We first focus on vertical equity—i.e., the distribution of the
effective tax rate on families at different welfare levels—and especially in
how much of the property tax burden is borne by the poorest families.
Estimating the incidence of the property tax requires detailed information
on the share of properties that are owned versus rented ones, and on the
welfare distribution of renters, home-owners, and property owners.
Additionally, it requires a number of assumptions, the most important of
which is the extent to which landlords can shift the property tax to
renters. Because of significant distortions in the land and property
markets in most municipal corporations, our analysis assumes that
property owners are able to shift the burden of the property tax forward
to renters, rather than bear it themselves in the form of lower capital
income from their properties. This assumption also implies that the tax
on land as well as that on structures is shifted forward, another unlikely
outcome. In this circumstance, we believe that these estimates will
understate the progressivity (overstate the regressivity) of the property
tax system. However, there is no reason to believe that the estimated
change in the distribution of burdens, occasioned by a change in the
assessment base, will be biased by this assumption about shifting.
Pune
We computed the distribution of property tax burdens in the PMC
area under two scenarios: the unit-based system as currently in
existence, and a simulated market rental system. Concentration curves
are shown below in figure 1a and 1b. A concentration curve is a
cumulative distribution based on the distribution of income, or, in this
case, of consumption expenditures. The dashed line shows the
distribution of consumption (per capita), the gray line represents property
taxes with unit or area-based system, and the line with breaks shows
estimated tax using ‘market rents’. Figure 1b shows the same
distributions for the poorest 25 percent of the population. The greater the
area between a curve and the 45 degree diagonal, the more unequal the
distribution.25
Figure 1: Pune -- Distribution of the Tax Burden Under Area-based and
‘Market Rent’ Systems
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￿ Cumulative proportion of population Consumption Expenditures
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￿ Cumulative proportion of population Consumption Expenditures
Property Taxes (Market Rents) Property Taxes (PMC)26
Our prior expectation is that the market-based system would be
less regressive than the unit-based system. The results are described in
figure 1a. This concentration curve clearly shows that there are
significant distributional improvements from moving from an area-based
to a ‘market rental’ approach. In comparison to the area-based system,
the tax burden using the market rents is less regressive with respect to
welfare status. For example, under the market-based system, the
poorest 40 percent of the population pay about 10 percent of the city’s
property tax. So while there have been considerable revenue gains by
moving from the previous rental value system to the area-based system,
further revenue as well as distributional gains could be achieved by
moving to a more ‘market’ based system that reflects the true value of
housing services.
Figure 1b shows that the poorest 25 percent of the population
account for about 10 percent of the overall consumption expenditures
and pays about 8 percent of the total property taxes with the area-based
system. In comparison, they would pay 5 percent of the overall property
taxes if taxes were assessed with ‘market rents.’ In summary, property
taxes in Pune are currently progressive with respect to welfare status.
The PMC is likely to increase revenues as well as reduce the tax
incidence on the poor with experiments to use market values and rents
as the basis of assessment.
Bangalore
Concentration curves of property taxes in the BMP are computed
with data from the previous rental values and the present zone-based
(unit value) system is shown in figure 2.  The dashed line shows the
distribution of consumption (per capita), the gray curve represents
property taxes with zone-or-unit based system, and the curve with
breaks shows estimates of tax liabilities using the previous rental value
system. It is difficult to distinguish if there are significant differences
between the two tax assessment systems.27
Figure 2: Bangalore -Distribution of the Tax Burden under Rental 
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Cumulative proportion of population Consumption Expenditures
Rental Values Area Based28
The figure on the right shows the distribution for the poorest 25
percent. This figure shows that the poorest 25 percent account for about
11 percent of the overall consumption, and pay about 11 to 14 percent of
the total property taxes. The poor in general are shown to pay around the
same proportion of property taxes as they have of consumption
expenditures.
Figure 3: Bangalore -Distribution of the Tax Burden Under “Market
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Cumulative proportion of population Consumption Expenditures
Area Based Market Rents
Capital Value29
Figure 3a shows the distribution of property taxes using `market
rents’ and ‘market values’. The black dashed curve shows property tax
distribution with the area-based system, the gray line shows taxes with
‘market rents’ and the dotted line shows the same with ‘market values’.
Neither figure shows significant differences in the distributional impact of
alternate assessment systems. 
In summary, property taxes under various assessment systems
are marginally regressive with respect to welfare status, but there are no
significant differences in the distribution of the burden among these
estimates.
Horizontal Equity
There are significant horizontal inequities in the design and
administration of the property tax in Bangalore and Pune.
18  These
horizontal inequities arise from preferential rates of tax that are levied
against residential versus non-residential properties, against owner
occupied  versus rented properties, and for older structures. In
Bangalore’s zone-base system for example, the valuation of property
relies on 16 classifications of land and buildings, and there is
considerable subjectivity in this. Certain properties receive partial or total
exemption from taxation. A better approach would be to allow the level of
assessed value of the property to be the sole guide in determining the
taxation of a property. Structural change could also improve the
horizontal equity of the property tax, whereby equals are treated equally
under the tax, and the tax does not interfere with market decisions in
inappropriate ways.
Rent control is another major problem, and as discussed in the
previous section, similar properties that are or are not subject to rent
control might face considerably different tax burdens. All property tax
systems introduce some degree of horizontal inequities. In many cases,
these can be justified on grounds of the government’s goals for its
property tax. However, when properties are taxed differently, there is an
incentive for land use to change because of the tax treatment. One might
question whether this is a desirable reason for land use choices,
especially in a country where urban land markets are dynamically
developing. Another issue is that when there are horizontal inequities,
the tax burden on one class of property rises relative to other classes.
ULBs must question whether such re-arrangements in tax burden are30
consistent with their policies. All of this points to the need for regular
equalisation studies to monitor the relationship between taxable
assessed value and true market value.
IV. Conclusion
The property tax is an important source of local government
revenues, but it has been relatively underutilised in Indian cities. There is
considerable need to enhance its performance, particularly in the context
of the directions laid down by the 74th CAA on decentralised governance
and finance. Many ULBs have started reforming the property tax,
focusing on fundamental issues of updating property tax rolls,
computerising billing and collection systems, and strengthening
enforcement. These have provided significant benefits in terms of
increasing revenues from the property tax. 
These reform efforts however mask significant underlying
structural problems that limit elasticity and buoyancy of the property tax.
These structural problems include the failure to resolve the conflict
between assessing the true market value of rents and property values,
and rent control ordinances. In addition, local governments often do not
have the capacity or the will to issue new valuation rolls, in some cases
for many years. Most reforms have been one off interventions or stop
gap measures, but comprehensive correction of the property tax system
has been lacking. Thus, growth in property tax revenues has been slow,
and unless structural issues are resolved, improved administration will do
little to make the property tax a viable revenue source for local
governments.
Our analysis of alternate assessment systems in Bangalore and
Pune highlights that structural reforms that link tax assessments to
market rental or capital values have the potential to significantly increase
aggregate tax revenues. In Pune, we find in fact that use of market
values also plays a redistributive role by reducing the tax burden in areas
with poor services and amenities  supporting the theoretical arguments
of the property tax being a benefit tax. Increasing property tax yields can
be accomplished by regular valuation of property at market levels, either
through maintaining a rental value system, or by moving to a capital31
value system. Bangalore’s experience shows that a one time move from
the previously used rental value-based assessment to an area-based
system increased revenues by around 62 percent. Adoption of market
rental values would increase revenue yields in Pune by an estimated 55
percent and in Bangalore by another 34 percent. For those places whose
valuations are still tied to controlled rents, the potential increases are
even greater.
While moving to a market value system is likely to be productive,
we need to consider some issues with the valuation process itself. If the
tax base does not reflect current market values, the tax cannot be
productive, its revenues cannot grow, and it will not be fair in its burden
distribution. As such, valuation is a difficult administrative task. If an
area-based system or a capital value system is chosen, then the basic
data currently comes from the stamp duty office. What scant evidence
we have from these case studies is that stamp estimates understate
market value by about 20 percent. With stamp and transfer taxes as high
as 15 percent of the transaction value in some states, there is
considerable incentive to understate this value. A thorough examination
of the efficacy of using the stamp data as the basic unit for valuing
property is a high priority task.
Discussions with the valuation department in Maharashtra
indicated that the Town and Country Planning Department conducts
property valuation based on a quasi-hedonic model approach. Valuers
apparently use information on sales, future developments, infrastructure
quality and local amenities/dis-amenities to estimate market values for
various zones in the city. Owing to the location of heterogeneous
properties within zones, limited trained staff conducting appraisals, and
considerable informality in the valuation process, it is of concern that the
valuation system may not accurately reflect property values.
If an area-based system is adopted, as existent in some of the
larger ULBs, then a method of updating the guidance values on a regular
basis is necessary. This will require not only reliable values from the
stamp office, and from the state ministries of construction, but also a set
of procedures for updating these values. It will also require trained staff,
capable of valuing real property, and perhaps a central valuation unit in
each state should be considered. There is much to be done to implement
such a system. Most local governments do not have a cadre of trained
assessors to evaluate property values and update them on a regular32
basis. A capital value system is even more difficult, because valuation of
individual units will be required. While introducing a true capital value
assessment system should be a longer term objective, local
governments must understand that the system will be difficult and costly
to implement. However, once carefully implemented, a capital value
based assessment system would lead to sustained revenue growth.3335
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Endnotes
                                                
1 Similarly, Ravindra and Rao (2002) show that 70 percent of developed
properties in Bangalore’s periphery were not on the tax rolls for six years.
2 An encouraging development is that property tax reforms underway are being
discussed in various ULBs, which have shown that, with appropriate changes,
revenues can be enhanced significantly.
3Technically, the base is the amount for which a property could be let out by a
willing landlord to a willing renter in a market free of encumbrances.
4 The analysis focuses on residential properties as the household survey data
only provides information on this category.
5 Our discussions with officials of the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) suggest
that it is difficult to identify properties in each of these zones, and the zone
differentiations are not regularly implemented.
6 The city corporation is also called the Bangalore Mahanagar Palike (BMP).
7 The Government of Karnataka has amended section 109 of the Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 permitting a move from the annual rental value
system to a capital value system for the purpose of property tax assessment.
8 A detailed description of the survey design and implementation is provided in
Deichmann et. al (2003).
9 Age of the rental unit is computed as being equal to that of the nearest
neighbour. This is a good approximation if housing units were built in stages. The
age of the dwelling unit is an important criterion in determining the tax. It
determines the rebate in the tax base from depreciation. Rate of depreciation
ranges from 10 percent for properties constructed during the last 5 years to 70
percent for properties older than 55 years. The basic property tax is determined
on the basis of size, location, age, use, and occupancy status of the dwelling
unit. To this, a surcharge for social development activities is added. Of the total
property tax paid, 74.6 percent is for the basic property tax rate, which includes
all adjustments on the tax base, and 25.3 percent for social development cesses
(surcharges).
10 The description of the assessment process is based on discussions with PMC
officials.
11 The maintenance rebates are offered regardless of whether the resident or the
landlord has incurred these expenditures.
12 The term “rateable value” is synonymous with the term “taxable value”,
“taxable turnover” or “taxable income” under other tax regimes. The word “rate”
used in the municipal acts across the country, in the context of property tax,
comes from U.K. (Ravindra and Rao, 2003).
13 The 40  percent homeowner rebate was applied to owner occupied housing.
14 The tax estimates for owner occupied housing are lower than the general
estimates reported in table 8 (Rs. 2,048 versus Rs. 3,815) in part due to the 40
percent rebate offered to these properties.34
                                                                                                            
15 Throughout this analysis, household welfare status is measured as total
household consumption expenditures following standard household survey
conventions (e.g., Deaton and Zaidi, 2000). While most tax studies in developed
countries use income as the main welfare measure in incidence analysis, income
is difficult to measure since people are reluctant to reveal this information even in
anonymous household surveys. Income also ignores welfare benefits from goods
that are not purchased regularly. For instance, a person who has inherited a high
quality dwelling unit realises significant welfare benefits from it, even if he has a
very low income. Another advantage of consumption expenditures is that they
include imputed values of in-kind transfers and own production.
16 The market rental values probably are still biased downwards as people’s
perception of rent are influenced by rent controls in various segments of the
market. It will take several years after repealing rent control regulations for
market rents to start approximating true market values.
17 We would like to thank TCPD officials for providing us with stamp duty values
(called “Ready Reckoner” values) for a sample of properties.
18 Many of these issues are common to other Indian cities.